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abstract
A New Public-Key Cryptosystem
Chris Hettinger
Department of Mathematics, BYU
Master of Science
Public key cryptosystems offer important advantages over symmetric methods, but the
most important such systems rely on the difficulty of integer factorization (or the related discrete logarithm problem). Advances in quantum computing threaten to render such systems
useless. In addition, public-key systems tend to be slower than symmetric systems because
of their use of number-theoretic algorithms. I propose a new public key system which may
be secure against both classical and quantum attacks, while remaining simple and very fast.
The system’s action is best described in terms of linear algebra, while its security is more
naturally explained in the context of graph theory.
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Chapter 1. Public-Key Cryptography
Symmetric-key cryptography is intuitive and often effective, but it requires that any two
parties wishing to communicate securely somehow exchange a secret key. Public-key cryptography makes it possible for any two parties to set up secure communications using only
a public, insecure channel, such as the internet.

1.1

The Need for Public Key

At its core, cryptography is about sending messages securely over insecure channels. Most
common channels of communication are inherently insecure. Letters can be opened, phone
lines can be tapped, and data packets sent over the internet can be read and/or copied. In
all of these cases, an attacker can steal a message en route while ensuring that it still makes
it to the intended recipient. With care, an attacker can do this such that neither sender nor
receiver knows what happened. This is a problem.
In theory, one solution to this problem would be to create a truly secure channel. For
example, two people who wanted to communicate securely could run a cable between their
computers and use it exclusively to carry their messages. In most cases, this is impractical
or even impossible.
A better solution is for two parties to communicate in their own secret language. Then
they can use an insecure channel without worry. Even if an attacker intercepts their messages,
he cannot obtain any information if he cannot translate the secret language. In practice,
this is achieved by treating messages as numbers (or other mathematical objects) and using
function-inverse pairs to ‘translate’ between normal and encrypted messages.
Suppose f (x) is an invertible function. If two parties both know this function, but nobody
else does, then one can take a message m, compute c = f (m), and send c to the other over an
insecure channel. The other computes m = f −1 (c) to recover the message. To an attacker,
c is meaningless.
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This is the idea behind symmetric-key cryptography [12, p. 71]. The key in this case is
the function f (x), which is known to both parties but secret to all others. It is symmetric
in the sense that both parties have the same information and are encrypting and decrypting
messages in the same way. Of course, this view is extremely simplistic. In reality, it is
difficult to make sure that an attacker cannot work out what f (x) is and compromise the
system. Today, however, there are methods of generating such an f (x) — such as the AES
[16, p. 102] and Twofish [13] algorithms — which are considered unbreakable.
The problem with symmetric-key cryptography isn’t that it is easy to break. It isn’t. The
problem is getting it set up in the first place. In order to do so, the two parties must share
some secret information [15, p. 123]. Unless they can meet in person, they are stuck. The
logic is perfectly circular — they can’t communicate securely unless without first sharing a
key, and they can’t share a key without first securing their communications.
Public-key cryptography exists to circumvent this apparent barrier. This is accomplished
through the use of two different keys: a public key and a private key. A person with the
private key is able to encrypt messages, but does not have the capability to invert the
encryption process and decrypt messages. A person with the private key can decrypt any
message encrypted with the public key. Additionally, the private key usually gives the
information necessary to recover the public key and encrypt messages [15, p. 144].
So an individual will generate a public key-private key pair and publish the public key
for all to see while keeping the private key a secret. Then any other individual can use
the public key to send an encrypted message to the first individual (who created the keys),
knowing that no other can decrypt it. No prior communication is required between the two
parties involved.
It is easy to design a function that cannot be inverted, and it is easy to design a function
which anyone can invert. It is difficult to give somebody enough information to compute
values of an invertible function but not enough to compute inverse values or discover the
inverse function.
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1.2

Trapdoors, Factorization, and Discrete Logarithms

A trapdoor is a door which sits flush with a wall or floor, having no handle on its outside
(the side toward which it opens). Thus it is easy to open from the inside, but difficult or
impossible to open from the outside. A trapdoor function t(x) is an invertible function —
that is, given an output y, it is possible to find the unique x such that t(x) = y — with the
property that it is easy to compute t(x) for any x, but difficult to find the x for a given y
[15, p. 145].
A common and important example of such a function is f (p, q) = pq = n, which takes as
its input a pair of primes p and q (order not important) and returns their product n. Given
p and q, it is trivial to compute n. Given n, however, it is very difficult to compute p and q
even though we know that the pair exists and is unique [15, p. 145].
When we say that factoring is difficult, this is not a statement of fact regarding some
sort of inherent difficulty to the problem. Rather, it means that there is no known method
for reliably computing p and q in a reasonable amount of time. If someone were to discover
a fast algorithm which consistently factored semiprimes (products of two prime numbers),
this would no longer be considered a trapdoor function, and the problem of factorization
would no longer be called difficult.
Another important trapdoor involves exponentiation in finite groups — for example, the
multiplicative group of integers modulo some integer n. Let ga (x) = ax be a function that
takes a fixed group element a and returns its xth power. This is generally easy to compute,
especially with optimizations like binary exponentiation. Then g −1 (x) = loga (x) is called
a discrete logarithm. Unlike logarithms of real numbers, discrete logarithms are infeasible
to compute in many groups [17, p. 201]. In fact, this problem is closely related to that
of factorization, and algorithms for one tend to have analogues for the other. There are
other trapdoor functions currently being studied. Of particular interest are some involving
lattice reduction and coding theory, but so far no cryptosystem using these has been widely
adopted.
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Public-Key cryptosystems are built around trapdoor functions. The trapdoor sits between the public and private keys in the sense that it is easy to derive the public key from
the private key, but computationally infeasible to derive the private key from the public key.
We will give several important examples of this which are in use today.

1.3

RSA, ElGamal, and Elliptic Curves

No discussion of modern public-key cryptography can be complete without an explanation
of the RSA algorithm of Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman. It is both one of the oldest notable
examples of a public-key cryptosystem (first published in 1977) and one of the most important
and common systems in use today [15, p. 144].
To create an RSA key pair, a user first chooses two large primes (hundreds of digits long)
p and q and computes n = pq. He then chooses an integer e and computes its inverse d
modulo ϕ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1). The user publishes e and n as the public key and keeps p,
q, and d secret. To send a message m to this user, one simply computes c = me mod n and
sends c. He then decrypts by computing m = cd mod n [19, p. 89]. It is hard to imagine a
cryptosystem more elegant or simple in its mathematical description.
The security of RSA lies in the fact that an attacker would need to compute d in order
to decrypt messages, but this requires knowledge of ϕ(n) or, equivalently, p and q. It is
generally believed that the best way to attack RSA is to factor n [16, p. 182]. Successful
factorization makes the rest of the attack trivial, but current mathematical methods and
computer technology cannot factor n as long as p and q are chosen sufficiently large. There
are a few caveats — there are special-case factoring algorithms that can succeed if p and/or
q have certain special properties [4, p. 412] — but these details are not a major concern. The
RSA system should be secure as long as factoring is hard and no better method of attack is
doscovered. Consequently, integer factorization is currently a major area of research in both
academia and industry.
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The discrete logarithm problem gives rise to a variety of public-key cryptosystems, most
notably the ElGamal system of Taher Elgamal [6] and a family of systems based in the theory
of elliptic curves [7]. Whereas RSA essentially forces an attacker to factor the product of
two large primes, these systems force an attacker to compute discrete logarithms over groups
for which this is difficult. Some of these systems, including ElGamal, introduce an aspect
of randomness into the encryption process [17, p. 212]. This makes it possible for one m to
be be encrypted as many different c, any of which would be decrypted correctly with the
private key. In practice, this can be an important advantage.
These systems are not without drawbacks. Otherwise, there would be little sense in
coming up with a new public-key cryptosystem. The most important drawback is that while
all are considered reasonably secure now, that security might crumble with the advent of
quantum computing. In 1994, Peter Shor described an algorithm which quickly factors large
integers on a quantum computer [11, p. 63] using discrete Fourtier transforms [1, p. 25]. A
variant of this algorithm efficiently computes discrete logarithms as well [14]. However, so
far quantum computers have not been built with enough size or speed for these methods
to be implemented on a practical scale. If the technology improves, secure communications
everywhere could be totally compromised and the aforementioned cryptosystems rendered
useless. The principal value of this paper lies in the presentation of a public-key cryptosystem
which would be secure not only against attacks with classical computers, but also against
Shor’s algorithm and other quantum computing methods.
Another drawback of lesser but real importance is that public-key methods tend to be
slower than their symmetric counterparts because they involve number-theoretic operations
(such as exponentiation in groups) for which computers are not optimized. This is in contrast
to, for example, the AES (American Encryption Standard) algorithm, which uses only the
simplest operations (mainly bitwise additions and table lookups) and so is very fast [17,
p. 151]. Other symmetric-key methods are similarly fast.
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It would be ideal to have a system with the unique advantages of the public-key setup
and the speed of comparably secure symmetric methods, and the system to be presented is
designed to be just that.

1.4

Digital Signatures

In addition to removing the need to exchange a key securely, public-key systems provide
a solution to the important problem of verifying a message’s source — that is, confirming
that the sender of a message is indeed who he claims to be [16, p. 274]. The ability to
communicate privately is of little value if the identity of the other party is uncertain, and
credentials like email addresses are surprisingly easy to fake.
The verification is accomplished essentially by using a cryptosystem in reverse. Suppose
two users, Alice and Bob (who have been suspiciously absent from the explanation thus far),
each have their own implementation of a public-key cryptosystem, and Bob wants to send
a message to Alice such that can be sure that only he could have sent it. To do this, Bob
takes his message and uses his private key to ‘decrypt’ it as though it were an incoming
encrypted message. He then encrypts the resulting message with Alice’s public key and
sends it off. Upon receipt, Alice decrypts the message with her private key just as she
would any other incoming message. She then uses Bob’s public key to ‘encrypt’ the resulting
message, undoing Bob’s initial decryption and yielding the original message. If Bob’s public
key undoes an operation, it must be the operation of Bob’s private key, which only Bob has,
so the message must be from Bob [15, p. 213]. This underscores the importance of keeping
a private key private. If an attacker can gain access to Bob’s private key without Bob’s
knowledge, he may be able to impersonate Bob with this method.
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1.5

Symmetric Key Exchange

Because of the speed discrepancy between public-key and symmetric encryption, it is common in practice to implement a hybrid cryptosystem that takes advantage of the strengths
of each. In this case, two users create public-key systems and use them only to securely exchange the information to set up a symmetric system, which they then use for all subsequent
communication [17, p. 259].
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Chapter 2. The Encryption and Decryption Functions
An instance of the system comprises a bijective function on the message space. We describe
this function and its inverse, the space upon which they act, and the keys that facilitate
their computation.

2.1

Bits, Words, and Blocks

The role of cryptography today is to secure the transmission of information stored on computers as strings of bits. It is natural, therefore, that a modern cryptosystem should be
designed to work with data in this form. With that in mind, we define a few useful terms.
First, let α be a small positive integer. A ‘word’ is a string of α bits. For example,
if α = 4, then 1101 and 0110 are both valid words. There are 2α possible words, so for
convenience define n = 2α . Let m be another positive integer. A ‘block’ is a list of m
words. An instance of the system will send a block of plaintext to a block of ciphertext and
vice-versa, and so may be thought of as a bijection on the set of blocks.
Let W be the set of words. It is worth noting that W is just that — a set. It will take
on different algebraic structures at different stages and it will be important to keep track of
how elements translate. Good values for α and m will be discussed later, when the proper
context has been established. To give an idea of scale, however, α will likely be around 10,
and m somewhere around 100.

2.2

Permutations

The symmetric group Sn is usually described as the group of permutations on n symbols [8,
p. 46]. Equivalently, we describe it as the group of bijective functions on the aforementioned
set W of n possible words, with composition of functions as the group operation. We’re
going to use lots of functions from this group.
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Let Snm =

Qm

i=1

Sn be the group (under composition) of functions on the set of blocks

which operate on each word separately (so this is a small subgroup of Snm , which consists of all bijections on the block as a whole). A function f ∈ Snm is written as the tuple
(f1 , f2 , . . . , fm ). If we write a block P as [p1 , p2 , . . . , pm ], then f (P ) = [f1 (p1 ), f2 (p2 ), . . . , fm (pm )].
Such functions will form a sort of ‘buffer’ to keep attackers from gaining information about
the encryption operation.

2.3

Finite Field Arithmetic

Let q(x) ∈ F2 [x] be irreducible of degree α and let Fn = F2 [x]/(q(x)) be the finite field of
n = 2α elements where F2 = Z/2Z [8, p. 278]. The elements of Fn are polynomials in x with
coefficients in F2 and of degree at most α − 1. We will identify the elements of Fn with the
words of length α in an obvious way, by letting the coefficient of xi correspond to the ith
digit (from the right, counting from zero) of the word. For example, if α = 4, we identify
x3 + x2 + 1 with 1101 and x with 0010. We then can speak of adding and multiplying words
by carrying out the corresponding operations in Fn [15, p. 250].
Addition in particular is very easy, as it amounts to performing a binary XOR on the
words [17, p. 40]. So 1100 + 0111 = 1011 and 1011 + 1010 = 0001. Conveniently, Fn has
characteristic 2, so addition and subtraction are the same operation. Hence we can code
arithmetic only in terms of the former.
Multiplication is not trivial (especially by hand), but can be implemented efficiently. To
naively compute the product of two words, we would compute the product of two polynomials
and then reduce modulo q(x). For example, let α = 4 and q(x) = x4 + x + 1. Then
0101 · 1011 = (x2 + 1) · (x3 + x + 1) = x5 + x2 + x + 1 = 1 = 0001, with the last step using the
fact that x5 ≡ x(x4 ) ≡ x(x + 1) ≡ x2 + x mod x4 + x + 1. Division is possible in the usual
‘multiplication by the inverse’ sense, so in order to perform division one would have to know
these inverses, which are easy to compute by exponentiation using Fermat’s Little Theorem.
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In the case where α is very small, it might be advantageous to pre-compute a multiplication table. However, this table quickly becomes very large. A log table expressing the
various field elements as powers of a generator (x is an obvious choice) takes up much less
space and turns multiplication into addition and subtraction of small integers. Then our
previous example becomes 0101 · 1011 = x8 · x7 = x15 = 1 = 0001.

2.4

A Matrix Twist

Let GLm (Fn ) be the group (under multiplication) of m × m invertible matrices over Fn [5,
p. 34]. The most important element of the system will be a matrix T ∈ GLm (Fn ). In
addition to its invertibility, T needs to have a special shape.
First, T needs to have exactly three nonzero entries in each row and in each column. The
importance of this condition will be explained later, in terms of a graph closely related to
T . Given the expected size of m, this condition makes T very sparse. Here is an example
of one possible shape for T in the case where m = 7, in which the bullets represent nonzero
entries:


• •
•
 • •
•



•
• •




• •

 •



•
• • 



•
• •
•
•
•
In order to use T , we interpret a block P as a column vector over Fn . Then we can
multiply this block by T on the left to get a new block. This operation is essential because
it ‘entangles’ a block at the word level, in the sense that the words in the new block are
functions of several words from the old block. This is in contrast to the action of functions
from Snm , which operate on words individually.

10

2.5

The Private Key

We now have all of the pieces necessary to describe the actions of the encryption and decryption functions. Let F, G ∈ Snm and T be as above. Then define

E(P ) = G(T · F (P )) and D(C) = F −1 (T −1 · G−1 (C))
Here P is a block of plaintext and C is its corresponding block of ciphertext. They can be
obtained from one another by E and D, which are easily seen to be inverses.
The private key can consist simply of F , G, and T . The functions F and G may be
stored rather naively as lists of outputs which are treated as lookup tables. For example, in
the case α = 2, m = 3 we might write f1 as [01,11,10,00], meaning f1 (00) = 01, f1 (01) = 11,
f1 (10) = 10, and f1 (11) = 00. Writing f2 and f3 likewise, we can store F as a 3 × 4 array of
2-bit words.
This method may not be strictly optimal in terms of information density when α is larger,
as it takes nα = log2 (nn ) bits to store each Sn function when one could theoretically use only
log2 (n!) bits for each, but the added complexity would almost certainly not be worth the
space saved. The first part of the private key consists of F −1 and G−1 stored as described
here. Because F and F −1 take up the same amount of space, it is better to store F −1 than
to store F and waste time inverting it before each use.
It will, on the other hand, be worth storing T instead of T −1 for two reasons. First, T can
be stored in very little space because of its sparsity, which T −1 cannot be expected to share.
Second, the method described here will come in handy later when publishing the public key.
We store T using two m × 3 arrays called S and V . S stores the ‘shape’ of T by listing in
ascending order the three columns in which each row has its nonzero entries. In the case of
the diagram on the previous section, S would be [[1, 2, 6], [2, 3, 7], . . . , [1, 5, 7]]. Technically S
could be stored a bit more efficiently (for example, the last row could be inferred from the
previous), but not by a meaningful amount.
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The nice, banded shape of the example might invite an even more streamlined representation, but in general this will not be the case. The array V then stores the actual nonzero
entries of each row, in order from left to right so as to match the way columns are listed in
S.
T is easy to invert using conventional methods. In particular, inverting a matrix over a
finite field is very nice computationally as stability and precision are not concerns (as they
are when working with, for example, floating-point reals). In most cases, inverting T before
beginning decryption will not add meaningful time to the process. So the second part of the
private key consists of T stored as described.
Of course, one could publish F , G, and T in the same form and allow others to encrypt,
but this would also make public enough information to easily decrypt. In order to assemble
a public key that does the former but not the latter, new pieces are needed.

2.6

Affine Interjection

Let P and C be a plaintext-ciphertext pair again. It is easy to see that an individual word
ci of C is a function of three words of P - the words corresponding to the three columns
in which row i of T has nonzero entries, or the three words indicated by row i of S. That
relationship looks like this:

ci = gi tsi,1,ifsi,1 (psi,1 ) + tsi,2,ifsi,2 (psi,2 ) + tsi,3,ifsi,3 (psi,3 )



For greater generality, we define the function

ei(x, y, z) = gi tsi,1,ifsi,1 (x) + tsi,2,ifsi,2 (y) + tsi,3,ifsi,3 (z)



and note that E(P ) can be broken down into the sequence of ei in order to compute the words
of C individually. It’s a bit more complicated conceptually, but computationally equivalent
to what was described before - just with the steps re-ordered.
12

Still in the spirit of making changes with no net effect, we define just a few more objects. Let ai , bi,1 , bi,2 , bi,3 ∈ Fn with ai nonzero. Let bi = bi,1 + bi,2 + bi,3 . Then we define
0
0
0
∈ Sn by
, fi,3
, fi,2
gi0 , fi,1

0
(x) = aitsi,j ,ifsi,j (x) + bi,j
gi0 (x) = gi((x − bi)/ai) and fi,j
for 1 ≤ j ≤ 3. Then it is clear that

ei(x, y, z) =

gi0

0
(x)
fi,1

+

0
(y)
fi,2

+

0
(z)
fi,2



even though this composition involves four different functions (which are still in Sn ) than
those in the definition of ei above. It is this fact that will allow the existence of a public key
that facilitates encryption but not decryption.

2.7

The Public Key

Using the same lookup-list method of representing Sn functions as before, we can put these
0
into convenient arrays. Specifically, we define arrays Ei for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
newly minted gi0 and fi,j
0
0
0
. These m arrays
, fi,3
, fi,2
such that the rows of Ei are, in order from top to bottom: gi0 , fi,1

are all 4 × n and their entries are α-bit words. Of course, in order to encrypt, one must know
which plaintext words to plug into these functions, so the final array included in the public
key is S - the same S from the private key that locates the nonzero entries in T .
0
For any fi in the private key, there are three fi,j
in the public key which differ from it

(and from each other) only by composition with an affine function. One could cut the size
0
of the key roughly in half by only giving only one of the three related fi,j
and then providing

the necessary constants to derive the other two therefrom. For the sake of simplicity, we
won’t worry about this optimization here, but it might be worthwhile in practice.
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2.8

Implementation

In practice, it is important that a key pair for any system be generated with good pseudorandom methods [17, p. 41]. It is trivial to use a good random number generator iteratively
to make the many permutations in the private key, and to generate all of the ai and bi,j used
in making the public key. Filling in the nonzero elements of T randomly could result in a
singular matrix, but in this case a random (nonzero) change to any element should fix that.
Choosing a shape for T is not at all a random process, as this shape must give certain
specific graph-theoretic properties to be discussed later. However, because the shape is
public, there is no reason to ’generate’ one at all. In fact, it is likely that if this system were
widely implemented that all users would simply select from a handful of particularly good
shapes, and this would not present a problem.
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Chapter 3. Reverse Engineering
The best thing one can hope to do when attacking a public-key cryptosystem is deduce the
private key from available information, so it is paramount that this be infeasible.

3.1

The Symmetric Buffer

The most important part of the system is the matrix T because it creates asymmetry — the
defining characteristic of a public key system. Because T has its particular sparse shape,
but T −1 does not, it is possible to give all of the information needed to encrypt a message
without giving the information needed to decrypt one. By itself, however, the action of T
is just a linear transformation, and a particularly nice one at that. The reason F and G
exist is to prevent an attacker from gaining information about T from either side without
sacrificing the speed and simplicity of the system.
Of course, when it comes to information about a linear transformation, the sparsity of T
together with the shape information available from the public key would seem to be a gold
mine. However, m and n don’t need to be very large for the set of possible T with a given
shape to be enormous. Since there are 3m entries in T , there are (n − 1)3m ways to fill them
in with nonzero elements of Fn . It is possible that some of the (n − 1)3m possible T will fail
to be invertible. It seems reasonable to assume (though it might be hard to prove) that the
determinants of the possible T should be distributed equally, or nearly so, in Fn . As every
element of Fn is a unit, this would make us expect (n − 1)3m+1 /n valid possible T for a given
shape.
The purpose of the F and G ‘buffers’ is then not to obscure in any way the shape of
the transformation, but rather to make it infeasible to determine the values in V . We shall
discuss how this is accomplished, but first we must show that an attacker needs to discover
the values in V .

15

3.2

Equivalent Keys

This system is unusual in that a given key - public or private - does not correspond to
a unique partner. The method of constructing a public key makes this obvious, with the
random selection of ai and bi,j yielding some n3m (n − 1)m options that all encrypt identically.
Given one public key, it would be easy to derive many others, though there would be neither
enough time nor enough memory to compute any significant proportion. If one could take a
given public key compute all of the equivalent public keys, one of them would consist of all
of the original gi and fi (three times each) from the private key.
Likewise, two private keys can can decrypt identically. Multiplying T on the left or
right by an invertible diagonal matrix and making commensurate changes in the fi or gi
respectively would yield an equivalent private key. This yields (n − 1)2m identical private
keys, and these could in turn give rise to an even greater set of public keys equivalent to
those described in the previous paragraph.
First, it’s important to note that while these classes of equivalent keys are quite large
in one sense, they are very small relative to the set of possible keys. Given a particular
matrix shape, one could generate (n!)2m (n − 1)3m+1 n−1 different private keys, and dividing
into equivalence classes of the aforementioned size barely makes a dent in this number. So
we won’t run out of non-equivalent keys, nor need we worry about the probability that
two keys generated independently will be equivalent (assuming good pseudorandom number
generation, of course).
Second, the issue of equivalent keys is not necessarily cause for alarm. It just requires a
paradigm shift when considering possible attacks. In this chapter, that means analyzing the
difficulty of finding a private key equivalent to the desired one. It’s not a tremendous shift,
but it merits explanation. Since we will be thinking in terms of equivalence classes of keys, it
is natural to want canonical representatives for these classes. This simplifies the discussion
and allows us to talk about these representatives as though they were the classes, as we do
in modular arithmetic. The best representative will depend on the attack being studied.
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3.3

Affine Pass-Through

Another issue in showing that an attacker must get through the buffers, so to speak, is
that linear operators like matrices and our affine functions tend to play very nicely together,
interacting in simple and predictable ways [9, p. 175]. In particular, scalar multiplication
passes right through matrix multiplication. Since the only thing separating the private and
public keys is a handful of affine functions, this sounds problematic.
If we want a working private key, we need an F , a G, and a T . In a sense, we have the
latter two. We can use the gi0 as the gi and build a T from the given shape with ones for
all the nonzero entries. There is no expectation that these functions would initially help in
decryption - and this T might not even be invertible - but they are a logical starting point.
The first real hurdle to overcome, though, is choosing some fi .
0
for each index i with relations of the form
The public key gives three permutations fi,j
0
(x) = fi,k (rx + s) for some r ∈ Fn× and s ∈ Fn . Note that here it seems prudent to use r
fi,j
0
and s here instead of a and b to avoid confusion with the ai and bi,j used to create the fi,j
.

Given fi,j and fi,k , it should be trivial to work out the r and s that identify their relation
0
by matching two outputs from each. Further, it would be easy to take any of the three fi,j
0
would of course appear in this list.
and generate a list of n2 − n possible fi . All three fi,j

Out of the (n2 − n)m possible F one could choose by selecting an fi from each of these
lists, it is likely that none would work with the naive choices for G and T . Because the only
equivalent private keys are the ones described in the previous section, just using the gi0 won’t
work unless bi = 0 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m. In other words, even though it is easy to generate
the n2 − n possibilities for each fi and gi , being able to generate an equivalent private key
to the original is equivalent to knowing when the constant in the affine transformation is
zero, because while multiplication by constants can ‘pass through’ the matrix multiplication
under some circumstances, addition just cannot. There’s just no way to look at a permutation
individually and say whether this has happened. Plus, all of this assumes guessing the entries
of T correctly, which is certainly unlikely.
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Clearly there are too many things to guess simultaneously before one can check whether
those guesses are good by seeing if the resulting potential private key works as a whole. An
attacker needs a way to guess some parts of the private key and then verify them before
moving on to the next. In order to show that this is difficult, we’re going to need to take a
detour through a branch of mathematics not usually associated with cryptography, especially
of the public-key variety.

3.4

Girth

In chapter one, we talked about shapes for T , stating that it needed to have three nonzero
entries in each row and column without considering why. Now we have the context to give
motivation. We return to the example shape for the m = 7 case for convenience.


• •
•
 • •
•


•

• •




• •
 •




•
• • 



•
• •
•
•
•
The connections between plaintext words and ciphertext words that we see in this diagram
are more naturally understood in the context of graph theory. As the rows of T correspond
to words of the plaintext and the columns to words of the ciphertext, having a nonzero
entry in the (i, j) position indicates a connection between pi and cj . So we draw a graph in
which the vertices represent words and the edges represent these connections. It will be an
undirected graph, which might be counterintuitive as the encryption operation has a definite
direction. This is because an attacker can ’travel’ along edges in both directions in a manner
to be discussed later.
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In the case of the above example, one might draw this graph as follows:
p1

p2

p3

p4

p5

p6

p7

c1

c2

c3

c4

c5

c6

c7

Drawing the graph in this way makes a few features obvious. First, it is necessarily a
balanced bipartite [18, p. 3] graph on 2m vertices, as both the plaintext and ciphertext blocks
consist of exactly m words and there cannot be connection between words in the same block.
Second, it is obvious from the way T was defined that this is a cubic (or 3-regular) graph
[10, p. 15].
This example is unusual in that its structure is simple and easy to see — even pretty.
For larger m, things will be messier. More importantly, this graph is unusual in that it
exemplifies a trait that will prove crucial to the security of the system: high girth. The girth
of a graph is the length of its shortest cycle. It will be useful to think of girth in terms
of a ‘cycle game’ in which a player starts at a vertex and follows edges around the graph,
attempting to return to the starting vertex in as few moves as possible without using any
edge twice. Note that because our graphs are bipartite, their girth will always be even.
The above graph is known as the Heawood graph and has a girth of 6 [3]. In fact, it is
a 6-cage — it has the least vertices of any cubic graph with girth 6. The converse is true
as well - 6 is the highest possible girth for a cubic graph on 14 vertices. It is known that a
graph of even girth g must have at least 21+g/2 − 2 vertices [2]. So the shape shown above is
an ideal choice for T when m = 7. Permuting the rows and/or columns of T will not change
the graph at all, so in this sense there are many equally good shapes.
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If one were going to make an instance of the system with m = 7, it would be foolish to
use any shape but these. Any other would have less-than-optimal girth, making the system
less secure. There is no value in using a different graph than others because it is published
in the public key (in the form of the array S).

3.5

The Cycle Game

Let’s continue with our example. In it, c1 depends on p1 , p3 , and p7 . Suppose an attacker has
guesses for f1 , f3 , f7 , g1 , and all the relevant entries of T . By plugging in several triples of
values for p1 , p3 , and p7 , we will have a high chance of quickly identifying our set of guesses
as defective when some triples don’t give the right c1 as output. While this is still crude from
a strategic viewpoint, it’s much less expensive than guessing a whole private key and testing
it for equivalence to the desired one. On the other hand, having guesses that pass this test
0
is no achievement in itself. A trivial way to pass is to use g70 , its three corresponding fi,j
,

and ones for the T values. An attacker can generate every passing set by picking random
constants in a method almost identical to the one used in making the public key, with one
small addition.
0
In order to generate such a set, an attacker starts with the gi0 and its fi,j
. He then

randomly generates r, t1 , t2 , t3 ∈ Fn× and s1 , s2 , s3 ∈ Fn . and defines s = s1 + s2 + s3 . He
then makes the following guesses:
0
gi(x) = gi0 ((x − s)/r) and fj (x) = (rfi,j
(x) + sj )/tj
(where j takes the values of the indices of the three plaintext words that determine ci ) for
the true private key functions. The difficulty lies in trying to extend this particular set of
guesses all the way to a full private key without it failing. The difficulty of doing so is a
function of the girth of the graph just described.
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Suppose we have a set of guesses as above. In particular, look at the f1 from that set.
Since f1 is also used in the computation of c6 , it needs to pass a test there as well. So we
need to come up with guesses for f5 , f6 , g6 , and a few more entries of T that work with
our f1 . This means repeating the process just outlined with the r, sj , and tj but with the
constraint that the constants chosen yield the same guess for f1 that we have already made.
This will uniquely determine r and one each of the sj and tj (the sj and tj corresponding to
f1 ). The rest of the sj and tj can be chosen randomly.
We can try to continue this process with c7 , but trouble will almost certainly arise. In
this case, focusing on c7 would have us look at f2 , f6 , and f7 . We already have guesses for
two of these, and the new guesses we make must agree with both. However, it is highly likely
that our f6 and our f7 will put contradictory constraints on the choices of constants. If so,
it’s the end of the road.
Recall from the section on equivalent keys that some multiplication by constants can
leave a private key intact, but addition of constants cannot because they can’t pull through
the matrix action. So if at any stage in this guessing game the s constants failed to cancel
out the b constants added when the public key was made, we are doomed to fail. Yet this
can only be seen upon completing a cycle of the graph, at which point the contradiction was
apparent. This is the importance of girth. The more steps an attacker must perform on the
way to this contradiction, the more unlikely his success.
In fact, by keeping track of random guesses, we can see that the difficulty of successfully
closing the cycle increases exponentially with the girth g of our graph. If we only consider
the possibility of not cancelling out the added constants (and there are other ways to lose
this game, as T can be picky), an attacker must guess three correct s constants on the initial
step, which will happen 1 in n3 times. Then with each successive step he must guess an
additional two (assuming g > 4, which prevents two ci from having multiple pi in common).
Then g/2 steps to a cycle gives a 1 in n3+g (or 1 in 2α(3+g) ) chance of success. As just stated,
this considers only one reason for failure and so constitutes a weak lower bound on difficulty.
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This finally answers the critical question left unanswered in chapter two: how does one
choose a good shape for T ? It is smartest to choose α and an even girth g simultaneously so
as to make the cycle game sufficiently difficult as per the formula just given. Then choose a
balanced bipartite cubic graph of girth g either by generating one or (more likely) by using
a well-known example. In particular, it is natural to look at the known cages, as these will
result in the smallest m for a particular girth, which in turn will keep both key size and
runtime down. Then one can use any shape for T which is equivalent to the selected graph
(of the many given by permuting rows and columns).

3.6

Plaintext-Ciphertext Pairs

In symmetric encryption, giving an attacker access to even a small number of pairs of corresponding plaintexts and ciphertexts usually spells doom. Of course, in the public-key case,
an attacker has immediate access to every such pair. It is important to show that one cannot
generate a set of such which reveals helpful information about the private key. We are not
considering cases in which an attacker chooses a ciphertext and somehow (through either
implementation or user error) obtains the corresponding plaintext. This situation will be
treated in the following chapter. Here an attacker is alone with the public key, encrypting
plaintexts and looking for information in the output.
Preventing such an attack is another crucial function of the permutation buffers. Essentially, there are no ‘special’ plaintext-ciphertext pairs for this system because both sides are
randomized. There are many special vectors which can give one information about matrix
multiplication, such as the zero vector and the elementary basis vectors, and the eigenvectors
of a matrix. However, not only can an attacker not intentionally generate a plaintext which
will become such a vector after passing through F , he cannot even tell if a given plaintext
will become such a vector. This is why the fi and gi were chosen from Sn — for maximum
randomness — though in chapter six we will consider choosing them from a smaller group.
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It is difficult to imagine even a large list of plaintext-ciphertext pairs giving any more
information about the private key than is readily apparent just from looking at the functions
in the public key. This is true to some extent for any public-key system, but particularly so
in this case as there is so much randomness obscuring the structure of the system.

3.7

Partial Private Keys

Finally, we ask what an attacker could do if he could obtain a partial private key. It seems
unlikely that many situations would arise in which only some of a key was leaked, but as
this happened just recently to servers around the world, it merits consideration. To make
a long story short, several types of partial private keys would facilitate effective methods of
recovering the rest. As any reasonable person would conclude regardless of this fact, any
leak - partial or complete - is more than sufficient reason to generate a new key pair.
In particular, if an attacker had several fi and/or gi , it could render the cycle game trivial
by reducing the factor of increase in difficulty per step from n2 to n or even 1 if the relevant
functions to be guessed were available. Further, once one cycle is completed, it is possible
to complete other cycles that share several edges with it on the graph much more quickly.
Fortunately, the key space is so large that one user’s leak can be safely expected to leave all
others unaffected if generation is at all random.

23

Chapter 4. Cryptanalysis
If the private key is safe, the next priority is naturally to assure that there is no reasonable
algorithm for working out individual plaintexts.

4.1

Differentials

One intuitive but powerful technique in the analysis of a public-key system is to encrypt
closely-related plaintexts and look at the differences in the corresponding plaintexts [17,
p. 118]. In our case, it might be natural to choose two plaintexts which differ in a single
word. In this case, the three ciphertext words depending on that word would change while
the others remained the same. Turning this around, an attacker looking at ciphertexts with
many similar words can deduce that their plaintexts may differ in only a few words, and he
can determine which words those are.
In a naive implementation of the system, this might indeed be a problem, especially if
the plaintext being encrypted had exploitable structure that lined up with the division into
words. For example, if α = 8 and the data to be encrypted consisted of English text encoded
with UTF-8, it might be easy to tell if two blocks of the text differed in a small number of
characters. Other types of data might be similarly exploited by an attacker aware of the
context of the message.
While the system as described here does not address this concern directly, it it not hard
to sort out with existing cryptographic methods. So far we have treated the system as an
electronic code book-type block cipher as it is convenient for most theoretic discussions, but
in practice it would make more sense to use a mode of operation such as cipher block chaining
(with a random initialization vector) or counter mode. This would prevent ciphertext blocks
from revealing if their plaintext blocks were similar or even identical [17, p. 131].
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4.2

Distinguishing

Another classic problem in public-key cryptanalysis is that of ‘distinguishing.’ Essentially,
an attacker wants to be able to look at a ciphertext C1 and several plaintexts P1 , P2 , . . . and
determine quickly which of these plaintexts was encrypted to give C1 . With a deterministic
system, this problem is trivial to solve. One simply needs to encrypt all of the proposed
plaintexts and look for a match. This system is not only deterministic, it’s bijective. Every
possible block of ciphertext corresponds to a unique block of plaintext, so distinguishing is
as easy as it could ever be.
This could be changed through the use of random padding, at the expense of efficiency
[16, p. 128]. It would be silly to do so, however, without establishing the existence of a
problem. Clearly if an attacker knows that a message comes from a small set, he can use
this fact to find out which it is. So if you’re just going to send the message ”Yes” or ”No,”
and an attacker somehow knows this, you should probably fill the rest of the message with
random bits rather than all zeroes. Otherwise, a good mode of operation should handle this
problem as well by making it impossibile to generate a set of possible inputs for a given block
without access to insider information.

4.3

Plaintext Leaks

If there is insider information available in the form of a partial or complete plaintext, then
there may indeed be a problem. Of course, this would be equally true for any cryptosystem,
but it is reasonable to examine the nature of that problem in this specific case.
In the case of a partial leak, the cycle game comes back into play. If an attacker has two
of the plaintext words that determine a certain word of the ciphertext, it is trivial for him
to determine the third. With a relatively small number of the words, one can work out the
rest with a sort of domino effect. As m becomes large, it is reasonable to expect the number
of plain words necessary to grow logarithmically like maximum girth.
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In our by-now-beloved example, say an attacker has p1 , p6 , and p7 in addition to the
ciphertext. Using p6 , p7 , and c7 , he obtains p2 . Using p1 , p2 , and c2 , he then obtains p4 .
There are then multiple options for working out p3 and p5 . This hints at an interesting
problem in graph theory that might be studied in its own right: given one of these graphs
and all of the ci , what is the smallest set of pi that could be used to work out all the others
in this manner?
So a partial plaintext leak can quickly become a full leak. As stated in the previous chapter, this doesn’t allow an attacker to work out the private key and start decrypting other
ciphertexts. However, the idea of working out the rest of a partially leaked plaintext is important because it is the basis of the most important attack against the system. Fortunately,
it’s also the one the system is carefully designed to frustrate through graph theory.

4.4

Guess and Check

A discussion of brute-force attacks has been suspiciously absent so far. It’s not just because
the key and message spaces are so large. Just as an attacker can (and should) play the cycle
game as a much more efficient (if still untenable) alternative to true brute force, he can use
short graph cycles to work out a plaintext more efficiently. It just needs to be shown that
this process involves similar road blocks.
Instead of supposing that an attacker has obtained a few plaintext words corresponding
to a known ciphertext in some sort of leak, let him guess those values. Specifically, say an
attacker guesses a triple of plaintext words that give one of the ciphertext words, as one
can easily do. Then he can try to expand this to a full plaintext, checking along the way
for contradictions. If there is going to be a contradiction, naturally he wants to find it as
quickly as possible, so he will follow the shortest available graph cycle back to one of his
original guessed words. If he’s off track, his more recent guesses will imply that this word
is something other than he originally guessed it to be, showing that the original guess was
bad. Then the process has to begin again.
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For a given ciphertext word, there are n2 triples of plaintext words which give it correctly.
Specifically, choosing values for any two of the determining words will fix a unique third.
From there, an attacker can take any of the three words in the triple, choose another ciphertext word it affects, and look at its triple. He’s already got one value, so he chooses one of
the others from the n possibilities and the third is determined. This process continues until a
ciphertext word other than the ones he has used is fully determined by three of the plaintext
words he has chosen along the way. If that ciphertext word is determined to be something
other than the one in the actual ciphertext, he must begin again. This cannot happen until
he has completed a cycle on the graph, so the attacker has made 1 + g/2 guesses, each out
of n possibilities. The chance of completing a cycle successfully with this method is then 1
in n1+g/2 , and even then the job of working out a single plaintext block is not done, though
the hardest part is over.

4.5

Side Channels

Side channel attacks are fascinating because they don’t seek to exploit mathematical structure or software as much as the actual hardware used to run the software and transmit
messages. We should show that methods that have worked on other public-key systems are
of no use here.
In this system, the time taken for any encryption (respectively, decryption) operation
should be identical regardless of the particular message and key. There will be the same
number of additions and multiplications in every encryption (respectively, decryption) operation. The additions should all take the same time because they are really bitwise xor
operations. In a log table implementation, multiplications become additions of small integers. For these reasons, the electrical power used and other mechanical metrics should give
no information to an attacker, even if he is the one choosing the messages. This may not be
true for all hardware, however, so it is important to know if a method of addition operates
in constant time.
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This complete uniformity, or lack of structure in the message and key spaces, makes all
sorts of clever cryptanalysis difficult. There aren’t patterns to exploit other than the ones
the system wears on its sleeve, and we have discussed the exploitation of those. Unless we
consider genuine data leaks to be side channel attacks in the loosest sense, such methods
shouldn’t be relevant.
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Chapter 5. Practical Considerations
A secure system is only valuable if it can be implemented with acceptable ease and efficiency
in a full range of applications.

5.1

Temporal and Spatial Complexity

It is easy to say exactly which operations (and how many of each) will be necessary in
actually computing with this system. To do this for encryption, we just look at the ei as
defined earlier. Each one involves four lookups from lists of length n and two additions in
Fn (which are just binary xor operations). We need to compute m of these for a grand total
of just 4m lookups and 2m additions.
Decryption is not quite as fast. Hitting the ciphertext with G−1 and F −1 will take a
grand total of 2m lookups. In between those two steps, we must multiply a vector from Fnm
by a matrix from GLm (Fn ) (with no particular sparsity or other special properties) on the
left. Doing this naively involves m2 multiplications (using smart methods like the log table
described in chapter one) and m2 − m additions. There are asymptotically better methods
for these mutltiplications, but they are unlikely to be superior for the relatively small m in
use here.
Both operations use relatively little computer memory. Decryption can actually be done
entirely in place, so in a sense it requires none at all beyond that needed to hold the private
key and ciphertext. Encryption only requires holding a function from the public key and a
few words at once, so its memory requirement is similarly negligible.

5.2

Key Size

We remember that the public key consists of 4m functions from Sn stored as lists and the
shape array S. Then it has a size of exactly 4mnα + 3mβ bits if stored as described, where
β = dlog2 (m)e is the size of indices needed in S.
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The public key consists of F , G, V , and T which take up mnα, mnα, 3mβ, and 3mα
bits respectively. In practical applications, n will be large enough that we can use the rough
sizes 4mnα for the public key and 2mnα for the private key. So if one chose, for example,
α = 8 (so that words are exactly bytes, for convenience) and m = 63 (as the 12-cage has 126
vertices), we’d be looking at keys of about 32 and 64 kilobytes respectively - about an order
of magnitude larger than those of some other public key systems, but still tiny for modern
technology.

5.3

Scaling

As computers become faster and hold more memory, it could become necessary to increase
our parameters so that methods of cryptanalysis discussed remain impossible to complete in
a realistic amount of time.

5.4

Portability and Nativeness

This system is designed specifically to work with data types and operations for which all
programming languages, operating systems, and hardware types are already optimized on
a deep level, so it should work perfectly in any digital setting without special hardware or
software accomodations.

5.5

The Human Factor

Of course all of cryptography can be trivialized when implemented poorly by programmers
or mishandled by users. These things cannot be prevented mathematically, but designing
the system around common data types and simple operations should minimize confusion and
error. Beyond that, we can only hope that the hardware being used doesn’t already have
spy tech built in.
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Chapter 6. The Future
Where do we go from here?

6.1

A Smaller Group

The symmetric groups don’t discriminate. They allow any invertible function and so are
quite large. One could argue that in this application they are much larger than they need
to be. Selecting the fi and gi from a significantly smaller subgroup of Sn could reduce the
sizes of both keys quite a bit. In addition, if this subgroups were chosen for computational
properties (for example, one could use a subgroup of polynomial functions), then it might be
possible to encrypt and decrypt quickly without having to expand the functions to lookup
tables.
The most extreme suggestion with any plausibility would be to select fi and gi from the
group of affine functions on Fn . Such functions can be represented with only 2α bits each (as
opposed to nα bits as before) and computed with minimal cost, perhaps even more quickly
than lookups (depending on methods and hardware). Would this compromise security in
some way? If so, could a slightly larger or more complex subgroup avoid this downfall while
offering similar benefits? It certainly merits investigation, as the gains in lightness and
simplicity could be tremendous.

6.2

Efficiency Through Repetition

While the keys for this system aren’t terribly large, it would certainly be nice if they could
be made smaller without decreasing α or m. In the case of the private key, this could be
done rather easily by re-using permutations rather than generating m distinct fi and gi . For
example, one could choose a very small positive integer k, generate fi and gi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
and then say fi+k = f i for the rest of the fi , and likewise for the gi . In this case, the key
can be stored in a relatively tiny space.
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The size of the public key could be similarly reduced by choosing the entries of T and
0
the ai and bi,j such that the gi0 repeat and there are only a small number of unique fi,j
whose

occurences can be described with a small table. As before, it should be reasonable for the
public key to be about twice the size of the private key.
Once these smaller keys were expanded for use, encryption and decryption could be
carried on exactly as before. It is natural, however, to be concerned that all this repetition
could be exploited for an effective attack on the system. In particular, if k = 1, one could
easily guess the private key by brute force. Is there some way to establish k and rules
for selecting the T entries and affine functions such that the keys could be meaningfully
reduced without compromising security? In a sufficiently large-scale application, it would
merit investigation.

6.3

New Graphs

In the system as described we used cubic balanced bipartite graphs for several reasons. Most
importantly, vertices with at most two edges could be trivially bypassed in cryptanalysis,
and vertices with more than three edges make high girth harder to achieve, so it seems
natural to make the graph cubic. The simple relations between the ci and the pi dictates
that the graph be balanced bipartite. However, it is conceivable that other (presumably
more complex) graphs could make the crucial ‘cycle game’ more difficult for given n and
m. This might require multiple matrix operations — or entirely new operations combining
multiple plain words in the computation of individual cipher words — in the encryption
process. This could in turn result in spatial gains, but more importantly it could allow for
smaller m, thus speeding up the decryption process.
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6.4

Rings and Ideals

All of the math here is done over a finite field, but could be generalized without difficulty
to any commutative ring. It’s tough to imagine going beyond commutative rings because
we need to invert matrices — though perhaps this could be done cleverly with LU decompositions - but even the commutative case gives a much wider range of algebraic structures.
Working over a ring, one would have to take a bit more care in making sure T and the ai
were invertible, but this would not be hard.
The feature that mandates a little extra care is the same one that presents an interesting
possibility here — rings can have nontrivial ideals. Consider the case R = Z/nZ, A ∈
GLm (R), x, y ∈ Rm , and Ax = y. Here, though A is invertible, many of its entries may not
be, and multiplication by one of the non-invertible (in this case, we might equivalently say
‘even’) elements of R necessarily results in a loss of information. Many such multiplications
happen in Ax = y, yet all of the information that is ‘lost’ in a local sense is preserved
elsewhere in the system, because the operation is invertible.
This property could have interesting implications, perhaps forcing an attacker to guess
more simultaneous plaintexts than are already necessary, or at least accelerating the branching in the cycle game. Using direct products of multiple rings could have structural and
computational advantages, but only if an operation were used in encryption that caused the
individual coordinates of their elements to interact, so that the system could not be pulled
apart into several smaller ones each acting on one coordinate.

6.5

Beyond Affine

Here the public key differs from the private key only by the affine functions ‘interjected’
between the fi and the gi . Could a broader and more complex family of functions be used
for added security (and a larger key space)?
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In other words, given

ei(x, y, z) = gi tsi,1,ifsi,1 (x) + tsi,2,ifsi,2 (y) + tsi,3,ifsi,3 (z)



as before, what functions hi , hi,1 , hi,2 , hi,3 could be used such that

gi0 (x)

= g (hi(x)) and

0
fi,j
(x)

= hi,j fsi,j (x)



for 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 while preserving

ei(x, y, z) =

gi0

0
fi,1
(x)

+

0
(x)
fi,2

+

0
(x)
fi,2



as before? It seems likely that going beyond the affine case would require that the the fi and
gi be used in defining the h functions, as to work in general hi needs to ‘split’ as only affine
functions can. A good method for taking the fi and gi and generating non-affine h functions
would both add difficulty to future cryptanalysis and be mathematically interesting in its
own right.

6.6

Layered Encryption

After a round of encryption, each ciphertext word depends on exactly three plaintext words.
If one were to then encrypt the ciphertext again - either with the same public key or with
another - the resulting second ciphertext would have words which depended on up to nine
of the original plaintext words. Some might repeat, making the ‘up to’ necessary, but by
combining complementary matrix shapes this effect could be minimized or, for sufficiently
large m, avoided entirely.
After a few rounds of encryption, one could achieve full dependency in the sense that
every word of ciphertext depended on every word of plaintext. This certainly sounds like a
desriable quality and it would make the attacks in chapter three no better than brute force.
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However, this could not be accomplished naively by simply sending out several public
keys and instructing the recipient to use them in turn. In that case, an attacker would just
attack them one at a time, in reverse order.
To gain significant security from layered encryptions, one would have to combine these
several public keys into one key which gave the recipient the ability to compute the final
ciphertext without giving the ability to compute the intermediate ones. Using methods
analogous to those in the first chapter would give an unusably large key. If there is a
method that keeps public key size reazonable without giving away private key information,
it could result in an even more secure system and reduce or even remove the graph-theoretic
considerations.

6.7

The Quantum Question

Several quantum algorithms are known which are significantly better than their classical
counterparts [11], and none are more famous than those that compromise today’s most
important public-key cryptosystems. These algorithms tend to gain their advantage from a
few operations which quantum computers perform exceptionally well, such as the discrete
Fourier transform. So far, it does not appear that quantum computers are better at solving
the problems relevant to breaking this system than are classical computers.
As research accelerates, it is possible that this could change. It would not take a tremendous number of qubits to hold a superposition of all the possible ai and bi,j . Whether an
algorithm exists which could operate on this qubit string with a high probability of returning
the correct ai and bi,j , is beyond the scope of this paper At best, we can use heuristics to
deem it unlikely due to the lack of exploitable structure. Then again, someone could conceivably design a classical algorithm to solve the same problems while cleverly avoiding the
pitfalls outlined in chapters two and three. Really, it’s impossible to say.
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